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Scientists and the Public* 
By u. A. HAUBERt 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past few years our scientific periodicals have been 
featuring articles on the social responsibility of scientists. The re-
tiring president of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science in his presidential address last December at Atlanta 
chose for his topic Science and People ( 1) rather than a technical 
subject. And a year before that E. D. Adrian in his presidential 
address to the British Association stated that: 
The Association must show the layman where the scientific 
age is leading him. It is by its impact on public opinion that the 
success of these meetings must be judged. (2) 
The trend toward emphasis on the relationship that exists, or 
should exist, between scientists and the general public is coming 
to a head, thanks, in part at least, to the threat of the H-bomb. 
It is of interest to note that as far back as 1912, two years before 
the first World War, a prominent scientist made this statement: 
The scientist . . has his dreams about the future. He dreams 
of the time when the engines of destruction will be so powerful 
and certain in action that war will be impossible, and the world 
shall become one great community of enlightened, intelligent 
human beings dwelling in peace and unity. (3) 
Commenting on this statement Ilse Bry and Janet Loe write: 
By the middle of the century, scientists believed that the en-
gines of destruction had become powerful enough and sufficient-
ly certain in action to annihilate life on earth; but they were 
not so sure that this means fulfillment of the rest of the dream. 
( 4) 
There is now a clear realization of the fact that scientific progress 
alone will not make this a better world to live in; something more 
is needed. With this need in mind, a group of scientists met at 
Haverford College in Pennsylvania in September, 1949, to form 
a "Society for Social Responsibility in Science." ( 5) In the summer 
of 1950 Albert Einstein in a letter to the Society wrote: 
In our time scientists and engineers carry particular moral 
responsibility, because the development of military means of 
mass destruction is within their sphere of activity. ( 6) 
To live up to this social and moral reponsibility will not be easy. 
One difficulty is pointed out by Prof. I. Rabi of Columbia Univer-
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sity in a recent address at Harvard. He called for "greater under-
standing between scientists and humanists to combat a growing 
mood of anti-intellectualism," and he says: 
The non-scientist cannot listen to the scientist with pleasure 
and understanding .. science seems to be no longer communic-
able to the great majority of educated laymen .. To his col-
leagues in the university the scientist tends to seem more and 
more as a man from another planet, a creature uttering pro-
found but incomprehensible truths. ( 7) 
Another difficulty that must be faced is expressed by Bertalanffy 
in the sentence: "The basic symptom of present society seems to 
be the uprise of the masses or the proletariate." ( 8) The behavior 
of these "masses," he thinks, is determined not by any process of 
reasoning; it is the modern types of propaganda broadcast to every-
one by methods of mass communication that determine how they 
think and act. Their behavior is the result of more or less blind 
conditioned reflexes developed under the influence of radio and 
television. 
Science has become so important in our times that the very 
survival of mankind depends on it. In a democracy such as ours,-
therefore, it is imperative that scientific work receive the spon-
taneous support of the general public. Somehow a situation has 
developed recently in which the public is inclined to be hostile to 
the scientists; at least there is a gap between them that should not 
exist. What can we, on our part as scientists, do to improve this 
unsatisfactory relationship? 
(1) We must m:ake every effort to help the lay public under-
stand the value and importance of science by translating its lessons 
into popular language. Forty or fifty years ago that was relatively 
easy; there still were for example, as I well remember, first rate 
scientists at Iowa University, men like MacBride and Nutting in 
the field of biology, who could address a non-science group and be 
understood by them. Indeed, they were not only understood, they 
were applauded. Such men are rare today because of the extreme 
specialization demanded of anyone who is to be proficient in his 
field. Good . scientists who can explain the significance of their 
work in plain English are no longer common. But the thing must 
be done. 
( 2) We should have in our schools, especially in high schools, 
a science teaching program.that will reach the majority of students. 
Recent surveys show that we are not as well off in this respect now 
as we were a generation ago. In our present educational setup, in 
which everybody goes to high school, when all pupils whether bright 
or dull attend the same classes, and especially when the student 
has a voice in what he is to take, it would seem that we simply 
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must make the courses attractive. Whether this is possible without 
at the same time making them superficial seems questionable. 
Possibly by covering less ground in the high school course and at 
the same time giving more talented pupils special assignments, the 
problem can be solved. 
(3) We must convince the layman, and that means the factory 
worker, that fundamental scientific research is important in the 
economic life of the nation. Modern science has made it possible 
for the average man to enjoy the good things of life which form-
erly were available only to the wealthy few. Engineering, mathe-
matics, physics and chemistry have made possible our prosperity 
which is dependent upon successful methods of mass production. 
The biological sciences have enabled. us to pile up a supply of food 
in superabundance. And so on. Such facts can· be presented to 
the public in a way that partakes of the sensational, even of the 
spectacular. The ordinary lay folk will follow the argument if it 
is presented to them in the kind of language to which they are 
accustomed. 
However, before a get-together of scientist and the general public 
will produce results, misunderstandings must be removed. Besides 
the two factors already mentioned that give rise to such misunder-
standings, namely the esoteric nature of science on the one hand, 
and the anti-intellectual mood of the public on the other, a third 
one may be mentioned. It is this: the ideology or fundamental 
outlook on life of many representative scientists, as indicated in 
their writings, is quite different from that of large segments of 
the general public. While this statement does not hold for all 
scientists, it does apply to a majority of those who have gone on 
record. It is this phase of our problem that I have attempted to 
discuss in some detail in this paper. 
VALUES AND FACTS 
To introduce our topic we may quote Morris S. Viteles (9) who 
sounds a warning by calling attention to the important distinction 
between values and facts. He writes for psychologists, but his words 
are applicable to all scientists, and if we substitute the word "sci-
entist" for "psychologist," here is what he says: 
There is a tendency on the part of the scientist to inject value 
judgments in a manner that makes it increasingly difficult, 
especially for the layman, to detennine when the scientist is 
dealing with facts and principles derived from experiments, or 
when he is merely presenting his own value judgments. It has, 
in other words, become increasingly difficult to know when the 
scientist speaks with the authority of science or when he is 
playing the role of social reformer clothed-or even disguised-
in the garb of the scientist. 
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_In _saying _this _I _am, naturally, not denying the right of the 
scientist to his opm10n-to his own value judgments .. It is not 
his privilege, however, to clothe the source and personal nature 
of such opinions in the language and form of scholarly writing 
to the point where it would appear that they are the outcome 
of scientific inquiries .. There is no better time than now to re-
call the forceful appeal of A. V. Hill that "scientists should be 
implored to remember that, however accurate their scientific 
facts, their moral judgments may conceivably be wrong." ( 10) 
, Value judgments vary with one's outlook on life. And it is a 
well-.known fact that modern scientists, especially the biologists, 
have developed a fundamental philosophy of their own. They have 
encouraged an attitude toward the great problems of human ex-
istence that tends to irritate the non-scientist, both humanist and 
Christian. 
To come to grips with this situation it is desirable to state clearly 
what these attitudes are and what lies behind them. · 
THE Two IDEOLOGIES 
I. Materialism 
Under this heading of materialism we may stress the nineteenth 
century theory of determinism and the present-day philosophy of 
chance. 
The pioneer physicists and chemists of a century ago were so 
impressed by th.e rigidity of the physical laws of nature that many 
of them yielded to a special form of materialistic metaphysics 
known as determinism. In their thinking there could be no excep-
tion to the laws of physical causation. If, they argued, some super-
intellect could know the exact location and motion of every material 
particle in the universe at the present moment, then that intellect 
could accurately predict all future events. Human activities were 
not considered an exception, and free will, that is to say, human 
responsibility, was called a myth because it could not be fitted into 
the material scheme of things. ( 11) 
This philosophy was popularized by men like Ernst Haeckel in 
Germany at the turn of the century ( 12) . It was not so much the 
new science as this· type of revolutionary value judgments preach-
ed by militant scientists, that initiated the Warfare Between Sci-
ence and Theology (13); and it has always been my conviction 
that this outlook on life seeped down into the minds of the com-
mon people and prepared the way for a Nazi mentality a genera-
tion or two .later. 
Strange as it must seem to some scientists today, in the nine-
teenth century chance happenings were considered unthinkable. 
In the twentieth century, however, the pendulum of materialistic 
philosophy has swung from the former extreme of absolute deter-
minism to the' opposite pole which denies casuality altogether. 
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The emphasis now is on chance as a "cause" of the phenomena of 
nature. It is frequently argued, for instance, that life developed on 
our earth by accident, so to speak. In the languag~ of George Wald 
( 14) the origin of life is a chance event, one "highly improbable" 
but one that need happen only once in a billion years and is 
therefore, somehow, "inevitable." 
Such background philosophies as these belong in the domain of 
metaphysics rather than in that of the natural sciences. And, more 
to the point here, they constitute an ideology that is quite contrary 
to Christian thinking. Some of our best scientists are very outspoken 
in their support of this "new thought"-which incidentally was 
common in ancient Greece; they insist that this is the only rational 
philosophy and that it must eventually replace all religions as we 
now know them. 
II. The Christian Philosophy of Life 
The Christian outlook on life is opposed to any form of material-
ism. It is based on the conviction that there is design and purpose 
in nature, and that back of the design and purpose there is Al-
mighty God. It stresses the dignity, the value and importance of 
the individual human being; man is not wholly a victim of circum-
stances determined by heredity and environment, he has the power 
of free choice and is therefore responsible for his conduct. And 
finally, a fundamental tenet of Christianity is faith in a personal 
immortality after death. 
It is true, indeed that the public with which the scientist must 
live and cooperate is composed of individuals with a variety of 
attitudes toward the meaning of life. Perhaps only a bare majority 
of Europeans and Americans are actively affiliated with any church 
organization; but a large section of the others subscribe, in theory 
at least, to some or all the principles of a Christian outlook on life 
as here stated. Belief in God is so natural to human thinking that 
the common man takes it for granted. 
Scientists, like all men, have a right to elaborate and give ex-
pression to their own metaphysics and their own religion or lack 
of it. But before they broadcast such matters they will do well to 
reflect ( 1) that they are no longer dealing with scientific facts 
and theories, and (2) that the materialistic outlook on life so com-
mon among them is an attack on principles and ideals for which 
men will fight and die. The Christian way of life is one in de-
fense of which there have been innumerable martyrs. I feel that 
much of the hostility between scientists and the general public is 
on this level where men feel as well as think. As long as a consid-
erable number of our top scientists continue to preach a gospel 
that is diametrically opposed to the gospel of Christianity there 
will be war, cold or hot, between scientists and the general public. 
I propose, therefore, to discuss this situation as one of the sev-
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eral reasons for the growing conflict. In doing so, of course, it will 
be necessary to refer to my own philosophy of science, and I shall 
endeavor to give some reasons for the faith that is in me; but I 
definitely have no intention of dictating to others what ideology 
they should adopt. 
The problem is complicated because the different outlook on life 
is not only between scientists and the lay public, but between indi-
viduals and groups of scientists among themselves. This last fact is 
strikingly exemplified in two very recent books which will be cited 
in the course of this paper ( 26,40). 
Moreover, while the difference between the two ideologies is 
deep-seated, much of the antagonism could be avoided if people 
understood one another. Because they are careless with their sem-
antics it often happens that men argue with some heat about details 
that, properly understood, have little if any bearing on fundamen-
tal principles. If misunderstandings were removed there would be 
no argument. 
MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
We may take as an example two theories on the origin of life that 
are commonly considered irreconcilable: the spontaneous generation 
of life and the creation of life by God. Oparin ( 15) has 
a book on this subject which from the scientific point of view is 
highly significant and worth while. In the main he confines his 
discussion to an account of "Life's coming into being" (see intro-
duction to the second edition of the translation), an account 
which is a detailed description of the hypothetical chemical trans-
formations that preceded the arrival of living things on our earth. 
His book is on a scientific level throughout and rarely touches on 
metaphysics. When it does, as when for instance he refers to the 
"dogma enunciated by St. Augustine of God's will, which arbitrarily 
interrupts the usual order of things" (page 11) he is misinformed. 
Among early theologians Augustine is the one who emphatically 
does not accept an arbitrary interruption of the laws of nature. 
In his philosophy God created the "seeds" so to speak, of a material 
world; and the present inhabitants of this world are a natural 
development of the potencies put there in the beginning. God does 
not, according to him, interfere in the unfolding of these potencies. 
Oparin, however, does take for granted that a scientist must 
adopt a "consistent materialistic philosophy" (page 33) . This is a 
statement that neglects the principle of semantics and therefore 
gives rise to misunderstandings. If he means that a scientist who 
investigates nature must confine himself to the study of its material 
aspects he is quite right. But the layman, misled by the word 
philosophy, does not distinguish between the material aspects of 
nature and its total essence; in fact, Oparin himself does not call at-
tention to any such distinction, and therefore leaves himself open 
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to the charge that he is materialistic in his philosophy-especially 
since he uses the word-as well as in his science. 
In an excellent article under the same heading, "The Origin of 
Life" George Wald of Harvard declares that: 
The reasonable view is to believe in spontaneous generation; 
the only alternative, to believe in a single, primary act of creation. 
There is no third position ( 14). 
Interpreted in the context of a scientific discussion there can 
hardly be any objection to this statement; but taken by itself, and 
as interpreted by the general public, it is ambiguous, easily misin-
terpreted, and needs to be clarified. From the broad human out-
look the two views arc not mutually exclusive, rather they may 
be complementary. One may hold with Augustine that a single 
act of creation of matter and its potencies was necessary before 
there could be any spontaneous generation. 
At the present time it may still be an open question whether or 
not inorganic matter has among its properties the potency of becom-
ing organized into protoplasm without external intervention, that 
if, without the addition of some non-material entity. But it is a 
problem that will be solved, if at all, by the scientist, not by the 
philosopher or religious thinker. 
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CAUSES 
To help clarify our thinking in this matter we may recall the 
old distinction between primary and secondary causes, a distinction 
stressed by the ancient Greeks, the medieval scholastics and by the 
18th century William Paley. These thinkers all agree that back of 
nature, which is to be looked upon as a secondary cause of mater-
ial phenomena, one must look for Nature's God who is the primary 
cause. 
Perhaps Paley stressed the idea until it became boring to the 
general reader. Moreover, he was misleading when he left the 
impression that divine intervention occurs in natural phenomena; 
since his time, 150 years ago, we have learned that nature takes 
care of itself, that the scientist, as a scientist, gets along very well 
without bringing Goel in the picture. As I see it Paley overempha-
sized the obvious while today we tend to reject the obvious. 
In order to give a modem twist to an age-old mode of reasoning, 
let us consider one of our present-clay automatic machines. An 
engineer designed it so that it is self-regulatory-push a button 
and raw material is transformed into· a complex finished product. 
If the analogy drawn from this example savors of naive anthro-
pomorphism, if it implies the habit of assigning human attributes 
to Deity, one can only say that, while it is admittedly figurative 
and hopelessly inadequate, it is still nearer reality than the anemic 
abstractions of some of our modern philosophers. 
We ask the question: Who made the finish eel product emerging 
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from the machine? Was it the engineer or the machine itself? The 
answer is obviously, both; the idea came first and its execution 
followed. The designer of the machine is the primary cause and the 
machine is a secondary cause. If the question is asked: Does the 
machine have within itself the power of doing this job, the answer 
is definitely, yes, that is the way it was made, that is its nature. 
This is a form of reasoning as old as the hills and even more 
substantial. It tells in figurative language that one may ascribe the 
creation of life to God as a primary cause inasmuch as he is the 
inventor and builder of a "creative machine" known as nature; 
nature then acts as a secondary cause. 
The only alternative to this thesis is to ·call Blind Chance and 
Natural Selection primary causes. 
One may at this point call the attention of theologians, cautiously 
of course, to the fact that modem science has helped to clarify 
our thinking on the relation that exists between God and the material 
universe. Sound Christian theology, indeed, that of men like Augus-
tine and Aquinas, clearly recognizes the principle that Goel works 
through natural causes, not by interfering with them. But lesser 
men have not always been as clearsighted; modern science is giving 
them food for thought. 
In keeping with this concept no one should ask the scientist to 
refer to Almighty God in his studies and experiments. If, for ex-
ample, the answer to the question: How did life originate? is 
simply: God made it, then there is no need for scientists at all. As 
Sir Arthur Thomsen puts it: 
To be content with the religious answer-always apt to become 
a soft pillow to the easy going-is to abandon the scientific 
problem as insoluble, and there can be no greater impiety than 
that. It is surrendering our birthright-not for a mess of pot-
tage; it is true, but for peace of mind. Therefore man is true 
to himself when he presses home the question: How has this 
marvellous system of Animate Nature come to be as it is? 
(16, p. 123) 
There are in nature secondary causes that operate to produce 
life in general and each existing thing in particular. It is one of 
the assignments of the investigator to trace the details of these nat-
ural causes. The religious thinker, as such, is not interested in the 
details of a machine, but he may not question one's right to ex-
plore them. · 
With these reservations, then, one may accept Oparin's and 
Wald's ideas about the role of chance in the origin of life. In the 
creation of the machinery which we have called nature, provision 
was made for chance events. that would be constructive. Wald 
himself time and again admits that this provision exists in the nature 
of matter when he uses such phrases as: "a spontaneous impulse 
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toward structure formation," "given the right molecules," "the 
molecules realign with regard to one another." (pp. 50, 51) 
Whether we look upon this "Fitness of the Environment" (17) 
as something that is primary and irreducible, ·as the materialists 
must do; or whether we call it the product of an Infinite Mind, as 
the Christian does, matters not at all for purposes of scientific 
study, but is all important from the viewpoint of our outlook on the 
meaning and purpose of the life we are here to live. 
All this should make it clear that one can believe in both the 
creation of life and also in the spontaneous generation of life. 
*** 
Another example of how misunderstandings arise may be taken 
from the difference between the narrowed down scientific approach 
and the broad philosophic and religious approach to the problem 
of just what is the conscious human mind, conscious thought. The 
following quotation may serve as an example: 
The real material universe exists and is a basic reality. Human 
life and thought are a part of it and emerge from it. Thought is 
the result of the activity of an organized part of the material 
world, and the brain is a reflection of, and in interaction with, 
this material universe (18). 
Again it is clear that from the scientific point of view such a 
statement is admissible. Modern science starts with the material 
universe and goes on from there. Human life is a part of this uni-
verse, and human thought is inseparably linked with it; it emerges 
when, and only when, the proper material basis is there. The 
scientist takes this material foundation for granted. As a scientist 
he is not investigating its ultimate origin. 
Unfortunately it happens too often that the type of thinking 
done by the specialist in the pursuit of his life work colors all his 
thinking as a man, with the result that he ends by being a material-
ist or at least an agnostic in his fundamental outlook on life as well 
as in his scientific investigations. For him there is no longer any 
reality beyond the material universe. That conscious life, human 
thoughts, may be immaterial seems altogether impossible to him. 
The religious minded individual, on the other hand, who wants 
to know the purpose of things, is also inclined to become narrow 
in his outlook because he seeks ultimate solutions of the big prob-
lems in the concrete happenings of the material world. He tends 
to invade the field of the scientist, a field for which he has no 
competency. 
THE CLASH OF THE Two IDEOLOGIES 
From this discussion of what may be called semantic carelessness 
it soon becomes clear that ordinarily the real disagreements are far 
more deep-seated; they are not at all due to misunderstandings of 
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details, but flow directly from the fundamentally opposed ideologies 
that we have defined. 
A concrete illustration of the struggle that exists between the 
opposite world-views is provided by the question of a distressed 
college student who comes to his advisor with the query: 
I am at the end of my rope. I have now lost my faith in science, 
and I gave up religion long ago. What am I to do? (19) 
At present the hostility between the two camps is quite general. 
, It is true that the ordinary run-of-the-mill scientific workers avoid 
the issue; but many, perhaps a majority, of our outstanding biol-
ogists have gone on record in favor of a strictly materialistic phil-
osophy of life; and the science major in college is indoctrinated with 
this philosophy and its anti-religious implications. In practice, of 
course, no one lives such a philosophy; no one can. But in theory 
it is defended and, what is more to the point here, it is claimed 
that science demands such a philosophy. 
One cannot dictate to any man, scientist or otherwise, what he 
should or should not subscribe to as a fundamental outlook on life. 
What can and should be done is to point out the consequences, 
from the viewpoint of public relations, of having scientists place 
before the public their own value judgments as necessarily implied 
by scientific findings. 
In reference to the problem suggested by the question of the col-
lege student, the Conferences on Religion in the Age of Science 
held in 1954 and 1955 at Star Island, New Hampshire (20, 21) 
have done constructive work that holds promise for the future. It 
is also of interest to note here that specialists in the physical sciences, 
men like Millikan, Eddington, Planck and a host of others, tend 
to be less, materialistic in their world views than the biologists. 
Their attitude was expressed by William James when he said: 
"Our science is a drop, our ignorance a sea." (22, p. 56) 
ScrnNTISM 
It is quite natural for workers in some one field to be so blinded 
by the brilliance of truths revealed to them in their specialty that 
they no longer appreciate values in other fields. Scientists tend to 
be affected in this way. For many of them not only their science, but 
their philosophy and religion too, are ·all based solely on the conclu-
sions of scientific investigations. 
This way of thinking has been called scientism, an ism that may 
be defined as an attitude which assumes that all problems that face 
mankind-social, philosophical, religious and moral--can be solved 
by an application of the scientific method developed in modern 
times. And biologism assumes that human conduct can be fully ex-
plained and expressed in biological terms, that any information 
obtained from other surces is worthless. 
Not all scientists, of course, or even a majority of them tend to-
10
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ward philosophical scientism; and many of them that do, admit 
that in this matter they speak for themselves alone. However, as 
stated above, the public does not distinguish between the scientist's 
science and his value judgments. 
In this paper I quote a number of first rate scientists who have 
put their value judgments on record and will not object to being 
referred to publicly by one who disagrees with their ideology. They 
may not agree that their utterances are harmful to good public 
relations, but that is a matter on which opinions differ and a free 
discussion is in order. 
We may begin with A. J. Carlson who has an enviable record 
as a scientist, is highly respected by those who through the years 
have been his students, and who is still active. His 1931 presidential 
address before the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science was entitled: Science and the Supernatural. Its author calls 
it "The confession of a physiologist of lack of faith in the supernat-
ural." The address was so popular among scientists that it was re-
printed in the Scientific Monthly in 1944 ( 23, 24) . Surely this 
official address to his fellow scientists by the chosen leader of Amer-
ican scientists will be taken by the public as representative of science 
in general. He admits, indeed, that: 
On the topic before us (Science and the Supernatural) it is 
preposterous for any man to speak for science as a whole and, 
by inference, for all scientists (23). 
but that admission does not change the impression that the public 
carries away from this address, namely that here we have the voice 
of science. His anti-religious bias is today as vigorous as ever. He 
recently made the following unqualified statement: 
The meaningful and enduring warfare is now between a gen-
uinely modern society . . and the organized religions ( 25) . 
Oscar Riddle in his latest book (26) condemns all organized 
religions after "a cursory look at the good and harm done by them" 
( p. xix) and refers to a fellow scientist, Henry Fairfield Osborn, 
who disagrees with him as one of the "self-appointed spokesmen for 
science" who "have betrayed it." (pp. 212-213) 
The following quotation from H. S. Jennings, a man who was one 
of our best and most influential biologists, one whom everybody 
loved and admired, needs no commentary: 
If then we .arc to foun~ our outlook on the world on what we 
discover in the scientific study of life, we are compelled to break 
with the notion that personality, individual identity, continues 
after death. We are compelled to conclude that the individuals 
who have disappeared exist no more than they did before they be-
gan life ... This I believe to be one of the fundamentals for a 
world outlook based on the study of biology. (27, p. 87) 
A statement found frequently in texts and scientific articles reads 
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something like this by A. Franklin Shull: 
The concept of teleology,' the purposefulness of events, has 
ever been a bar to scientific progress. (28, p. 6) 
The following value judgment is found, of all places, in a text on 
biology published by McGraw-Hill in 1954: 
In past centuries, much mental energy has been frittered 
away on questions like "What is the meaning of life?" or "Why do 
we live?" as if the answers lay somewhere out in the universe, 
just beyond our reach. Today it is time to recognize that either 
such meaing is beyond our reach or there is no external meaning 
at all. It is time for man to cast off the prejudices of his ances-
tors, to rid himself of the shackling illusions of the past .. (29, 
p. 649) 
An excellent and highly respected scientist, F. B. Sumner, in an 
article entitled A Biologist Reflects on Old Age and Death, refers 
to the idea of immortality of one's personality after death as ab-
surd. ( 30, p. 148) 
William E. Ritter, in a brief paper at a symposium in his honor 
held by the members of the Western Society of Naturalists, has 
this final paragraph in his address: 
To be rid of supernaturalism in every aspect of human life, 
not by explicitly rejecting it, but by such development of natural-
ism that there shall be no longer any need for supernaturalism, 
is the great stage of cultural evolution in which the human species 
is now struggling ( 31, p. 170) . 
S. J. Holmes in his Life and Morals (32) refers to man as an 
"animal a bit more advanced than the rest," (p. 10) and he calls 
science "the true Messiah." (p. 100) 
Andrew D. White's work on A History of the Warf are of Science 
with Theology was reprinted last year ( 13), 60 years after its first 
appearance. There may be sound academic reasons for such a re-
print as it is a study of the history of thought; but if it is meant for 
popular consumption I consider it worse than useless. To focus at-
tention on the mistaken judgments and misdirected zeal of many 
theologians of a pre-scientific era, whether Catholic or Protestant-
mistakes that now, in hindsight, seem utterly stupid-will not help 
to clear the atmosphere; rather it will tend to put off any reconcil-
iation of science with real religion and sound theology. White him-
self probably was not a materialist, but his "history" has been 
welcomed and will continue to be favored by those who are in-
clined toward a materialistic philosophy of life. 
What we need now is a work similar to White's which will quote 
theologians of the present generation. The entire field has changed, 
and the change is due, as -the average theologian is now glad to 
acknowledge, to the constructive work of the scientists. 
As an example of extreme scientism gone wild we may cite one 
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of our foremost biologists, H. J. Muller, who writes an article (33) 
which is a satisfactory summary from the scientific and technical 
point of view, but which also indulges in value judgments and in 
wishful thinking that has no basis whatever iq scientific experimen-
tation. For example: "Conscious phenomena are physico-chemical 
phenomena." The native intelligence of man is "not very much 
greater than that of some other existing animals." "Man as we 
know him is to be regarded as only a transitional operative in the 
progression of life." The principle objective of the human race is 
the "genetic remodelling of our primitive urges, the improvement 
of our intellectual ability, and even of our body construction." He 
ends by giving expression to his Utopian ideas in these words: 
If the mindless gene . . has generated mind and foresight and 
then advanced this product from the individual to the social 
mind, to what reaches may not we and our heirs, the incarnation 
of that social mind, be able, if we will, to carry consciously the 
conquests of life? 
Such language may be good rhetoric; it is not science. Let us 
repeat: a scientist has the right to formulate his own personal value 
judgments and to express them; but when he airs such views in 
public he is not speaking as a scientist or in the name of science. 
It is articles like this that confuse the layman and help to bring 
about a chasm between the two groups, the scientists and the gen-
eral public. 
As a final reference we may quote the following news item: 
A deep conflict between science and religion was taken for 
granted by many people during the nineteenth century. Recently 
belief that the two really complement each other has gained 
ground even among scientists. Dr. Linus C. Pauling, Nobel 
Prize winner and nuclear physicist, however, refuses to go along. 
Interviewed on the television program "Youth Wants to Know" 
· Pauling reasserted the skeptical tradition of a Thomas Huxley. 
He said: "I have great faith in man's intellect and I have felt 
that man should try to solve all problems by understanding and 
investigation .. and should not take matters on faith." (34) 
Coming from a Nobel Prize winner a sentence that begins with 
"I have great faith" and ends with the recommendation that one 
"should not take matters on faith," is striking evidence that out-
side of his field the scientist is very much like the rest of men. 
Each one of the names mentioned above ranks high in the scien-
tific world; I have not quoted any second raters. We applaud their 
scientific achievements, but we, that is to say the general public, 
will not adopt their philosophic scientism. 
THE INDIVIDUAL VERSUS HUMANITY 
H. J. Muller's dream of progress for the human race--! use the 
word dream deliberately-extends forward into a thousand gener-
13
Hauber: Invited Address: Scientists and the Public
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1956
1956] PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS 91 
ations. Not you and I, here and now, are important; only the hu-
man race matters. 
And that opens up a touchy topic. In the Nazi and Soviet ideol-
ogies, too, the individual is quite unimportant, it is only the state 
that counts. We know very well, of course, that our scientists today 
have no sympathy whatever with state absolutism; quite definitely 
the contrary. May we not suspect, however, that many of them 
have a fundamental attitude toward life which, if followed through 
logically, will tend in the direction of these state systems. An indi-
vidual who is a slave to an abstraction called humanity is, as an 
individual, little better off than one who is a slave to the state. 
(35, p. 109) 
The words of James B. Conant are pertinent here: 
Naziism triumphed in Germany not because the Germans 
were lacking in power to advance learning but because bad 
poetry and a wrong philosophy prevailed (36). 
The Germans were preeminent in science and, as we are learning 
recently, so are the Soviets. In both cases, however, their value 
judgments, based as they are on a materialistic philosophy, are not 
only unsound but definitely dangerous.' 
To the point here are the remarks of Bertalanffy who was quoted 
in the introduction to this paper. In his criticism of scientism he 
writes: 
If human behavior and history are only a product of biological 
factors, one of the most important factors must be heredity. 
What really matters, then, is not the individual or the culture 
but the hereditary substratum of the nation or race, and this 
quite logically leads to the notion of a master race and eventually 
to the justification of extinguishing others .. In other words, what 
really matters is not the individual but the supraindividual whole 
of the state, nation or race. Then the human individual becomes 
an expendable short-lived cell in the all-important whole .. (Of 
course) refusing biologism does not mean that we can neglect 
biology as the most important groundwork of behavioral science 
(8). 
In the text of the "Appeal by Noted Scientists for the Abolition 
of War" given out in London on July 9, 1955, signed by nine 
scientists, we find this wording: 
To call for a way of thinking which shall make such avoid-
ance of war possible is the purpose of this statement . . ·consider 
yourselves only as members of a biological species which has had 
a remarkable history, and whose disappearance none of us can 
desire. ( 3 7) (Italics mine) 
This statement is unacceptable to the average layman who looks 
upon man not primarily as a member of a "biological species," but 
as something unique-a human being. 
14
Proceedings of the Iowa Academy of Science, Vol. 63 [1956], No. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pias/vol63/iss1/8
92 IOWA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE [Vol. 63 
In contrast to such statements we may meditate on the words 
of President Eisenhower with whom the common man is in accord 
when he refers to: 
The wide gulf between the concept of man made in the image 
of his God, and of man as a mere instrument of the state (38). 
If we replace the phrase "mere instrument of the state" by "a 
product of blind evolutionary forces" we have an "orthodox" dogma 
of many modern biologists. 
To quote the President again: 
Either man is the creature whom the psalmist described as 
"a little lower than the angels," crowned with glory and honor, 
holding "dominion over the works" of his Creator-or a man is 
a soulless, animated machine to be enslaved, used and consumed 
by the state for its own glorification. It is therefore a struggle 
which goes to the roots of the human spirit, and its shadow falls 
across the long sweep of human destiny. (39) 
THE TREND AwAY FROM MATERIALISM 
As stated in the news item about Pauling, there is today among 
scientists a move toward reconciliation of science and religion. 
However, it will require a generation or two to bring about a chang-
ed attitude; traditions die hard among scientists as well as among 
theologians. 
Edmund Sinnott's recent Biology of the Spirit (40) is a conspicu-
uos attempt on the part of an outstanding biologist to break away 
from the superstitious fears of anything purposeful in nature. While 
there is still a touch of scientism in his reasoning, in that he attempts 
to derive man's higher nature from the properties of elementary 
protoplasm, he has definitely succeeded in "ridding himself of the 
shackling illusions" of a materialistic philosophy. He flatly asserts 
that "we face problems so profound that final answers to them lie 
beyond the competency of science;" and that man's spirit may be 
"regarded as similar in nature to a far greater Spirit." 
He admits that, for the time being, his book will give him the 
reputation of being "unorthodox" in the minds of other biologists. 
However, it is significant to find in a review of Sinnott's book the 
claim of another biologist that he is "even more unorthodox than 
Mr. Sinnott" ( 41) . Marston Bates, the reviewer, objects to Sin-
nott's apparent implication that the science of biology should be able 
to explain man's spiritual nature. The reviewer, evidently not an 
advocate of scientism, claims he is more unorthordox than Sinnott; 
Bates looks upon man "as more than an aggregation of purposeful 
protoplasm." 
There are, I am convinced, many other scientists who think 
much as Sinnott does, but hesitate to speak out because of fear of 
criticism. If his example encourages them to become insistently 
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vocal the whole picture of scientific materialism may quickly change. 
There have appeared from time to time a few other books-not 
many--by scientists who emphasize the importance of looking be-
yond science for an ultimate answer to the mysteries of the uni-
verse. Notably among these is The Great Design· ( 42), the intro-
duction to which is by Sir Arthur Thomsen, who was quoted above. 
He writes: 
Science is not the only kind of knowledge, it is not the only 
pathway towards truth, but it is indispensable .. What science 
seems to show is that we cannot "make sense" of the universe 
and our place in it unless we believe in the reality of Purpose-
of Divine Design that has counted throughout the past and will 
continue to count in the future. 
This is essentially the thesis of Sinnott's book. 
Another book worth rereading in these times is Michael Pupin's 
The New Reformation (43). As far back as 1928 he stated: 
If the signs of the times do not deceive then there is a univer-
sal drift toward this mental attitude-that God's spiritual real-
ities are illustrated and made intelligible by the physical things 
that are made. (pp. 272-3) 
This is a return to the viewpoint of the Bible, and to the view-
point of scientists generally before the middle of the nineteenth 
century. 
William Agar (35) discusses the causes that led to our modern 
materialistic philosophy of nature and of man. Among these causes 
are: 
a) The success of scientific methods which "brought results; it 
gave material comforts, enormous power .. and a control over nat-
ure that had never before been considered possible," and 
b) The simplicity of the mechanistic view as contrasted with Carte-
sian dualism. 
Having said this he makes it plain that today the very success of 
science threatens to break this strangle-hold of materialistic think-
ing. In place of the material comforts provided by the gadgets of 
science we arc now facing the terrors of an H-bomb; and there is 
nothing at all simple any more in the recent mathematical theories 
of the nature of the universe as analyzed by modern physicists. 
In this whole matter of materialism in science one may well agree 
with Ehrenfest: 
To believe that one can make physical theories without meta-
physics and without unobservable quantities, that is one of the 
diseases of childhood. ( 44) 
The Conferences on Religion in the Age of Science held in 1954 
and 1955 at Star Island, N. H., as reported by Ralph W. Burhoe 
( 20, 21) are encouraging signs of the times. When a group meets in 
which one speaker can say: "A religion that accepts the philosophy 
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of materialism is no religion at all" (20, p. 522), and another 
speaker insists that "Any alleged knowledge about an actuality 
transcending the temporal world is mistaken" (21, p. 1278), the 
stage is set for a discussion that will make everybody think. 
Personally I do not agree with a definition of religion that is to be 
formulated in "terms of a problem to be answered: what is the 
sphere of most concern to man?" Nor do I like the conclusion that 
the problem of what is of most concern to man "is at once a 
question of fact and of value, and value thus becomes a special 
cla.ss of fact." The point, however, is not that we disagree, but that 
we discuss our disagreements. 
It it is true that 
Many came away with a deeper understanding of what Pope 
Pius XII may have meant when he said to the Pontifical Acad-
emy of Science 22 Nov. 1951: "In fact, according to the measure 
of its progress, and contrary to affirmations advanced in the past, 
true science discovers God in ever-increasing degree-as though 
God were waiting behind every door opened by science.," (20) 
then something worth while has been accomplished. 
We may close this part of our discussion with a quotation from 
Joel H. Hilderbrand ( 55, p. 455) : 
We of the free world will not be saved by science alone, but 
we will not be saved without science. We will need our every 
resource of knowledge and intelligence in order to remain free. 
THE SPIRITUAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN NATURE 
It is clear that in discussing the nature of man one must consult 
the findings of modern biologists; but one must also draw on other 
sources for information. In this discussion, therefore, I am not 
speaking primarily as a biologist, but simply as a human being. One 
of my objectives is to show that the traditional philosophy concern-
ing human nature is not negated by modern science, but rather 
clarified and illuminated by it. 
Throughout the history of western thought, from the Greeks to 
Darwin, man has been defined as an animal rationale, a brute 
that thinks. This definition is surely still sound. But mod~rn science 
has contributed so much to our understanding of the animal part of 
the definition that it becomes necessary to modify some of the 
older ideas. In the historical development of a concept such as this it 
may be desirable to reject some of the ideas of past thinkers in 
order to bring the matter up to date; just as in a growing child 
the temporary teeth are rather violently removed, although it is 
only to make room for another set better adapted to mature life; 
continuity is not lost. 
When now we discuss the rationale part of the definition it is 
well to be on our guard against the concept that, because man is 
both animal and rational, he therefore has two natures. Human 
17
Hauber: Invited Address: Scientists and the Public
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1956
1956] PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS 95 
nature is one nature that performs the activities of a subhuman 
animal plus something more. It is only since the time of Descartes 
(+1650) that the definition animal rationale has come to imply that 
there are two opposed natures in man, the one animal, the other 
spiritual. In traditional Christian thought there is no such thing as 
"saving one's soul" without saving the body. The Apostles' Creed 
calls for a resurrection of the body, a glorified body, indeed, but 
something material. It is modern philosophy that has brought an 
excessive dualism into man's makeup. 
Yet, the fact that man .who is a physical part of the universe is 
able to analyze that same universe has always seemed a mystery 
to anyone who thinks deeply enough. Unfortunately, in a modern 
scientist's vocabulary the word mystery is taboo. However, to me, 
and to all men, this world is full of wonders, and wonders are 
mysteries. Some biologists like to deny all spiritual reality because 
it is "mysterious", but as likely as not they go on their knees to 
worship the physical basis of that reality, be it genes or frontal 
lobes or whatever their specialty happens to be. They like to talk 
and write about the marvels and exciting phenomena of the world 
about them, but the faculty which is able to marvel and get excited 
is not within their realm of thinking; it cannot become the object 
of research because it has no material earmarks on which one can 
experiment. 
If the above paragraph radiates a bit of sarcasm, that is simply 
a reaction to similar outbursts that come from the materialists. In 
any case the heat of irritation generated when opposite ideologies 
rub each other may produce a spark of light. It is friction that 
lights the match. 
Recent biology texts have a preference for a subtitle such as: Its 
Human Implications (45; the Human AjJproach (46); Man and 
the Living World ( 4 7) . A careful search, however, through the con-
tents of the book reveals nothing there on man as man. His animal 
nature and its evolution is stressed, his economic dependence on 
plants and animals is featured, but there is little hint that man is 
more than a biological entity. One gets the impression that he is but 
a speck in an astronomical universe, which is indeed true; but 
never a suggestion that there is another fact which is equally true, 
namely that in the realm of values man is more important than 
any astronomical universe, that the inorganic world has no value 
at all except in the mind of an intelligent being. Of course, authors 
of biology texts must treat primarily man's physical nature; but 
modern departmentalization of subject .matter is a poor excuse for 
giving students a wrong impression by the silent treatment. Fear 
of referring to anything spiritual has become something of a sup,er-
stition with too many scientists. 
A similar criticism applies to the public utterances of represent-
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ative scientists. The presidential address of E. D. Adrian, already 
referred to (2), is entitled: Science and Human Nature. It is an 
intensely interesting and thought-provoking allocution, but as far 
as any reference to any spiritual faculties is concerned there is 
only one sentence that is pertinent: " We must look. beyond phy-
siology for an adequate picture of the human brain in action." 
Personally I receive with gratitude and even with enthusiasm all 
the findings about man that modern science has given us: his origin 
during the Ice Age from some prehuman ancestor, his automatic 
bodily machinery, in a word all the facts about his animal nature. 
But I do not for that reason reject. the old philosophy that ascribes 
to him spiritual powers as well as animal characteristics; the life of 
the spirit is, as I see it, something fundamentally and radically dif-
ferent from purely animal activities. I do not understand how the 
two faculties are combined in one creature-no one does-but to 
me the fact is there. 
This matter of insisting that man possesses something essentially 
superior to anything found in brute creation is so fundamental, and 
at the same time so objectionable to many scientists, that a some-
what detailed discussion seems justified. 
ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE HUMAN INTELLECT 
As used in the English language the word intellect is something 
quite different from the word intelligence. We speak, and rightly 
so, of intelligent animals because by experience they automatically 
condition their reflexes so as to meet the requirements of something 
new in their environment. To a large extent human intelligence 
operates in the same way, though human acts are never purely 
animal in nature; man knows what he is doing and he tries to 
understand why he does it; he can analyze his own conditioned 
reflexes and deliberately improve on them. 
When purely animal behavior is analyzed four "psychic" powers 
may be recognized : 
1. Higher animals "perceive" material objects by means of the 
senses. In some way, replicas of material things and representations 
of their qualities, are impressed on the nervous system of the animal. 
W'e call these impressions, whatever they are, sense images. 
2. These images persist in latent form and they may, on appro-
priate stimulation, be "recalled." This is sense memory. 
3. Sense images may be combined or modified, and this manipu-
lation and recombination of the images is imagination, the forma-
tion of images within the or,ganism. 
4. Old images may be superimposed on new ones as these an; 
supplied by the senses in such a way as to apply the lessons of pre~ 
vious experience to the solution of present problems. This is the 
vis aestimativa of Aquinas, which may be translated "practic~i 
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reason." Animals thus ·solve material problems without the inter-
vention of any true reasoning process, although the end result def-
initely mimics abstract human reason. 
A hungry ape confronted by the classical banana-on-the-ceiling 
problem forms a series of images; of the banana, of the ceilinO'-to-
floor distance, of his own reach (a memory image) , and so 0 on. 
When these images do not click, he becomes restless because he is 
hungry, and looks about. He perceives a pole nearby, the length of 
which fits his distance-to-floor image. His constructive imagination, 
that is, his practical "reason" puts the two together, and adds a 
further image of himself manipulating the stick. The result is the 
solution of a material problem on a strictly material level; and, 
stimulated by hunger, instinctive action does the rest. 
Now man, being an animal, not only possesses all these mental 
faculties, but he is constantly using them. However, he also posses-
ses a faculty that is peculiar to man and totally absent in other or-
ganisms, namely the intellect. While this the one and only essential 
difference between man and subhuman animals, it is because of 
the understanding supplied by the intellect that man has the power 
of free choice; he .becomes responsible for his acts. In all other 
respects man acts like the animal that he is. 
Faced with a problem on the strictly material level, such as that 
of a hungry ape, man may proceed towards its solution in the same 
way as does an intelligent animal. But while doing so he may also, 
and he usually does, reflect on what he is doing: What makes me 
hungry? Why do I want a banana? Do I have a right to it? 
The answers to questions of this type require the power of abstrac-
tion. What is an abstraction? As an example we may here appropri-
ately cite the elementary idea of hunger. Hunger in the concrete is 
always associated with a material organism; it is a quality of a 
material being. An ape or dog can feel hunger, but he cannot separ-
ate that feeling of hunger from himself and think of it as such. 
He cannot make a judgment: I need food in order to appease my 
hunger. He cannot form ideas of qualities such as goodness, health, 
beauty, size, apart from the objects that possess these qualities. His 
mental images are of material things in the concrete only. He can-
not compose a sentence because that requires the bringing together 
of qualities apart from the concrete things that possess, these qual-
ities. 
We may not understand exactly what the images of an animal 
are like, but we may be sure that they are not purely physical 
phenomena in the crude sense that an image produced in a camera 
is a strictly material thing. A mental image of any kind is immaterial, 
and it is precisely for that reason that an ape cannot, like a man, 
reflect on what he is doing or thinking. He cannot form new images 
of his own images because these are not material objects that can 
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be mentally "photographed". An ape cannot control his thinking. 
Man, on the other hand, can reflect. To reflect means to bend 
back and here it implies the power of bending back one's thoughts 
from' the things thought about to the thoughts themselves. This is 
quite a different process from that of using the imagination. Im-
material processes, such as thoughts, cannot be imagined because 
they have no material earmarks that lend themselves to image for-
mation. The imagination of itself cannot form abstractions, though 
it is quite true that in human thinking the imagination must always 
accompany the activities of the intellect. The intellect is powerless 
in the absence of images from which it can take its abstractions. · 
Man's spiritual faculty cannot function without the help of the 
material organism. 
It is this intimate connection between the two faculties, imagina-
tion and intellect, that has led many thinkers to deny that man has 
anything superior to his animal powers. 'Vhenever one tries to an-
alyze human thinking it is the activities of the imagination, not of 
the intellect, that stand out and seem to be the whole process. 
To develop this important point a bit farther we may consider 
briefly the concepts of brain and mind. Are the two one and the 
same thing? At the risk of being considered dogmatic, I answer 
with a categorical No, they are not. The brain belongs to our 
material body which can be investigated; the mind is the non-
material investigator. It is true, of course, that without the nervous 
activity of the brain there can be no human thinking. Indeed there 
is reason to believe that if one could follow all that goes on in the 
human brain while a man is thinking, his thoughts could be inter-
preted from these brain activities. But the movements of matter 
in the brain are not the thoughts any more than the printed page 
is the thought of the author. Even if one could observe the minutest 
details of brain activity it would still require a mind, not just an-
other brain, to recognize what thoughts are there represented. In 
this connection it is worth while to repeat for the sake of emphasis 
the words of E. D. Adrian already quoted: "W c must look beyond 
physiology for an adequate picture of the human brain in action." 
PRIMITIVE MAN 
During the past year Raymond A. Dart of the University of 
Witwatersrand, South Africa, the discoverer of Australopithecus, 
reported finding the teeth of this creature in a deposit together with 
crudely chipped stone tools of the "Pebble Culture." (50) No one 
as far as I know, has called this southern man-like ape a man, 
though in brain capacity it is nearer to man than any recent apes. 
If future research confirms this association of tools with an anthro-
poid, as it may, science will have helped to clear our ideas of just 
what is the difference between strictly human activities and those 
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that men have in common with subhuman animals. Apparently 
the making and use of tools is within the range of subhuman intel-
ligence, inasmuch as it deals with the solution of practical problems. 
Such problems are habitually solved by animals with the help. only 
of the senses, memory and the imagination, though of course, the 
process is guided, or shall we say dominated, by instinctive drives. 
The intelligence needed for making tools is not essentially different 
from that needed by a robin to build a nest. 
Let's consider a bird's nest-building routine. It is a series of con-
secutive procedures that lead toward a goal, and it therefore pre-
supposes something that is at least the equivalent of human reason-
ing, though as a matter of fact it is much more. But the bird itself 
does not reason, it doesn't think at all about what it is doing. A 
robin is essentially a machine, a secondary cause of a whole series 
of automatic events. The reasoning, or the necessary equivalent, 
was done long before there were robins by the Creator of the uni-
verse. The Creator, however, did not design individual robins as 
a man might design a type of automatic machine. For ages other 
secondary causes had been at work, particularly those included 
under the name of evolution, to "create" the species known to us 
as the robin. By means of such a super-complicated series of sec-
ondary causes the robin was furnished its nervous system, its en-
docrines, its instincts, all of which operate in obedience to the "plan" 
in the mind of the original Primary Cause of the robin, the Creator 
of the universe as a whole. 
Now it is quite evident that man, in his ordinary physical and 
biological activities, in his metabolism, morphogenesis and reflexes, 
acts like any other animal, that is, mechanically and automatically. 
It is only when he investigates the why and wherefore of what he 
is doing, something never attempted by the brute creation; that he 
has recourse to his spiritual powers, that is, to his intellect. 
In other words, the preparation of crude tools may very well be 
an instinctive procedure; it is much less complicated than a bird's 
nest-building instinct. One can find no good reason why a sub-
human animal such as an ape could not chip flints even though 
it possessed no more power of reasoning than a robin. In man, 
then, the habit would persist until such time as his power of reason-
ing would replace, or at least improve, what had been inherited 
from prehuman ancestors as routine activity. 
AnouT EXTRASENSORY PERCEPTION 
Before taking up a discussion of the areas of contact between 
science and religion we may comment briefly on the alleged phe-
nomena of extrasensory perception. The recent controversy on 
ESP ( 48,49) reveals, as I see it, a mistaken concept in the minds 
of some scientists of what should be called supernatural. Su per 
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means above and outside of; in connection with natural it can 
refer only to the Author of nature. Since a materialistic philoso-
phy dispenses with this Author, anything supernatural becomes a 
priori impossible! Hence the rather violent condemnation of ESP 
since it seems to suggest the need of a supernatural explanation. 
But no ·matter what our attitude toward the supernatural, it 
seems clear to me at least, that these investigations are strictly 
in the natural order; the supernatural is not subject to investi-
gation by any conceivable set of experiments. Its acceptance de-
pends, in part at least, on value judgments; it is indeed inferred 
from facts of the natural order, but it is not one of the facts. 
It is not necessary to decide at this time whether the conclusions 
reached by the ESP proponents are valid. The whole matter seems 
to depend on the reliability of probability mathematics, and I 
agree with the statement of Bridgman that "the situation covered 
by the word probability is a desperately complex situation." ( 49, 
p. 17) What is needed is to establish the facts beyond reasonable 
doubt. Whether there is any explanation in sight for the alleged 
facts is not to the point; the scientist accepts facts when satisfac-
torily demonstrated whether they fit into any theoretical frame-
work or not. When in doubt he simply withholds judgment on 
the matter. But, in any case, we may be sure that no experiments 
of the ESP defenders will ever "demonstrate" the existence of 
supernatural phenomena. 
SCIENCE AND RELIGION 
It has always been my conviction that science and religion are 
mutually helpful, not antagonistic, and it is one of the objectives 
of this paper to discuss how this is so. Some of the best scientific 
work has been done by men who were strongly religious-Mendel, 
Pasteur, Janssens, and so on. The recent obituary of Teilhard de 
Chardin ( 51) reminds of the fact that the investigation of pre-
historic man has been promoted by a number of famous clergymen, 
Obermaier, Breuil, de Chardin and others. If devotion to religious 
ideals were opposed to the scientific attitude, as some would have 
us think; if the concept of teleology, the purposefulness of events, 
were a bar to scientific progress, as Shull says (27), this could 
hardly have happened. 
ScrnNCE AN Arn TO RELIGION 
On this topic one might preach a sermon, in line with the ideas 
of Sir Arthur Thomsen and Pope Pius XII, on how the wonders 
of nature point to an omnipotent, all-wise God; but in view of 
the fact that the modern scientific mind is allergic to such ideas, 
the temptation to do so must be resisted. However we may be able 
to agree on the following statements. 
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( 1) Science is destroying superstitions. Such phenomena as the 
persecution of witches will, we may hope, not occur again in his-
tory. 
(2) Science has demonstrated that many phenomena of the 
material order, which formerly were interpreted as examples of 
God's interference with natural laws, are in reality explicable by 
the action of these laws .. In this sense many theologians have been 
compelled to give ground, but it is ground that actually never was 
theirs. Theologians of the past had the mistaken concepts just as sci-
entists of the past had them. What else can one expect of human 
thinking? I am sure that some of my remarks today are quite in-
accurate. In a word, the facts uncovered by science are a help 
to theologians. 
( 3) Before this age of science too many people accepted an 
extremely literal interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis-
6000 years for the age of the earth, the story of a universal deluge, 
and so on. Such literal interpretations of Scripture were too often 
considered an essential element of religion. Science has now open-
ed the door to a more reasonable understanding of these ancient 
documents. A recent book entitled Beginnings ( 52) illustrates how 
this is done-not only the natural sciences are drawn upon but 
also those dealing with Oriental Antiquity. Scripture scholars can 
now clear up difficulties that formerly could not be solved. 
( 4) The religious outlook of the Commission of Cardinals that 
condemned Galileo was, unfortunately but understandably, tied to 
the science of the time; both religion and science insisted on a 
geocentric universe, a mistaken concept in the domain of science, 
and a narrow one for religious thinkers. When science corrected it-
self religion was one of its beneficiaries. 
( 5) The idea that Almighty God created each and every kind of 
plant and animal by a special divine fiat was quite generally ac-
cepted by scientists as well as theologians until after the days of 
Linnaeus. That nature of itself, as a secondary cause, could "cre-
ate" so to speak, the innumerable varieties and species of living or-
ganisms, seemed unthinkable to most people until science provid-
ed the pertinent facts to show that progressive transformism, i.e., 
organic evolution, has occurred. The result has been for theolo-
gians a greatly improved concept of how God operates in his 
universe. In this matter many theologians, being very human and 
conservative, were quite slow to accept the new outlook. By this 
time, thanks to the scientists, most of them are convinced. 
RELIGION AN Am TO SCIENCE 
Science gives men control of natural forces-electric power, 
atomic energy, food production, disease prevention. Religion is of 
no direct help in achieving these objectives, but indirectly it pro-
motes civilization and a state of law and order in society without 
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which scientific progress is impossible. 
Moreover, science puts at men's disposal more and more power, 
and power can be abused. Writing in 1948 after the second World 
War, S. J. Holmes has this to say: 
The deliberate mass murder, starvation, torture and fiendish 
cruelty inflicted on multitudes which run even into the millions, 
could have been carried out only by a people deliberately brut-
alized in accordance with an ideology which recognizes no moral 
obligation except to the state as the embodiment of power. This 
striking revelation of the diabolical possibilities of human na-
ture must come as a shock to those accustomed to thinking well 
of their kind. And it must be a bit disconcerting to optimists in 
general to reflect that, in spite of its great advances, our civil-
ization has just seen some of the darkest pages in history (32, p. 
180). 
Just where and how the Nazi group obtained their ideology 
"which recognizes no moral obligations" Holmes does not say. The 
Germans were in the forefront of scientific progress, and this thing 
happened. Judging from the context of his book Holmes would be 
unlikely to attribute it to the absence of religious training. Quoting 
him again: 
Catholics insist strongly on bringing up their children in the 
faith and instilling their beliefs into them before they can judge 
of their truth and falsity. This of course makes for institutional 
stability, although by unfair means .. The child should be given 
a fair chance to form his own (opinions) without being biassed 
in advance (pp. 169, 170). 
I am afraid that men like Holmes, Riddle and Carlson have no 
realistic understanding of human nature. They should know that 
only a small minority of mankind can make its own decisions in 
matters of this kind; if forced to do so, the chances are that they 
will arrive at decisions worse than any their parents could have 
given them. Moreover, bias canm>t be avoided in the training of 
children; if they are taught no religion they will be biassed against 
it. Civilization makes progress because children are indoctrinated 
with the lessons of the past: "no man is an island." The Nazi 
group which Holmes finds difficult to understand-which indeed 
no one can understand-was a group that had been indoctrinated 
from youth with a materialistic ideology. Their leaders were intel-
ligent men, many of them scientists. The words of Montagu are 
appropriate here: "An intelligence that is not humane is the most 
dangerous thing in the world." ( 53, p. 111) 
This is where religion becomes important. As a matter of fact 
I feel that it is fortunate that theologians were slow to yield to 
the new ideas of evolutionary science and slow to promulgate them 
among an unprepared general public; the early exponents of sci-
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ence tied it to a materialistic philosophy that is a real danger. In 
this connection we may quote E. D. Copeland: 
A people who break away from the teachings of religion, and 
permit their mortality to become as lax as ours has become, is at 
a serious, and eventually at a fatal disadvantage in competition 
with any people at all equal in other respects, which effectively 
maintains its code of conduct, by whatever means (54. p. 208). 
It is my conviction that the kind of philosophical evolutionary 
thought envisioned by men like Oscar Riddle, if "unleashed" as 
he puts it, among the general public, will in the long run make 
possible in society further outbreaks of what Holmes calls "The 
diabolical possibilities of human nature." 
ON FAITH 
All men, including the extreme materialists, have faith in some-
thing or other. For the man without religious convictions any faith 
he has is necessarily blind, that is, it is based on wishful thinking 
and sustained by an optimistic temperament. When analyzed, such 
faith has no bearing whatever on the future welfare of any in-
dividual or group of individuals; it is a sort of statistical average 
that does little more than give a comfortable feeling that all is well 
with the world. 
The faith of many religious people is likewise largely a matter 
of vague emotional pressure and wishful thinking. Yet· there is 
always a very definite difference; religious faith concerns the wel-
fare of the individual, it inspires to prayer, and one who prays 
speaks to a person, not to the shadow of an astronomical universe 
or to an abstraction called humanity. 
However, genuine religious faith is not primarily a matter of 
the emotions, it is not "blind faith." It is based on reason-on a 
reasoning process that takes into account all the facts, not merely 
those that lie in the domain of natural science. One such fact, 
one always assumed by scientists but formally ignored by some of 
them, is the existence of orderliness in the universe, the reliability 
of the laws of nature. When one argues from laws to a Lawgiver, 
to the existence of a Supreme Being, that is a process of reasoning, 
not wishful thinking. 
To the fact of the existence of God we may add another fact, 
namely this: on this earth there is no justice for men. Men of 
good will are not rewarded for their activities in behalf of their 
fellowmen; they often suffer ·because of their good will. Ort the 
other hand, men who prey on their fellowmen, men of ill will, 
frequently prosper in this life. This surely is a factual situation. 
Putting the two together, the existence of God and the injustices 
of this life, one must arrive logically at the conclusion that justice 
will be provided in a life to come. 
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Such reasoning, of course, does not compel the assent of any-
one; it is not a process of demonstration such as the scientist may 
insist on having. Still it is a process of logical deduction, not a 
matter of one's feelings. 
If some hard-boiled scientist, like Fred Hoyle for instance ( 56), 
were to ask me today: "Do you really believe in a personal im-
mortality?" I should be inclined to answer something like this: 
When I was young I had faith in a hereafter, a spontaneous 
faith which at times may have faltered a bit. However, as a bi-
ologist I have been compelled to meditate over the years on the 
scientific facts that pertain to my human body and I am no longer 
so sure that I have that same simple faith. 
When I reflect that for more than 70 years a thousand intri-
cate chemical and physical processes have cooperated harmoniously 
to keep me alive; when I realize that I have only the most super-
ficial understanding of what has kept my heart beating regularly, 
at least once a second, during these years; or how it is that my 
liver has kept excess sugar out of my blood stream by storing it 
until actually needed; when I consider the fact that my pituitary 
has stimulated my adrenal cortex with ACTH all along in just 
the right way; when I kn,ow that if these processes, and literally, 
a thousand others like them, had not cooperated harmoniously, I 
should never have been born, much less have survived through a 
long life; when I meditate on these facts, there arise at times 
doubts about the reality of even my present existence-the fact 
that I am here seems a fantastic impossibility! 
But of course the doubt is the doubt of a dream; when I awaken 
I know that this impossible reality, my physical survival, is some-
thing that cannot be questioned. Yet the passing doubt drives home 
a very thought-provoking truth, namely this: if my physical ex-
istence, dependent as it is for survival upon such inconceivable 
· complexity of structure and function, were not demonstrated, I 
could not accept its reality by faith alone! 
My actual physical survival is an incredible miracle beside which 
the survival of my spirit in an after life is an elementary and sim-
ple concept. My faith in a hereafter has been transformed into a 
conviction so absolute that I dare no longer call it faith. Faith is 
a virtue, while conviction is the equivalent of knowledge. 
When one combines scientific facts, such as those of my physi-
cal body, with the common sense fact that there is no justice in 
this world, then faith is put on a rational basis. Hoyle, the pessi-
mist, says: "It seems to me that religion is but a desperate attempt 
to find an escape from the truly dreadful situation in which we 
find ourselves (p. 125) ." How anyone who has meditated on the 
survival of the human organism in spite of "impossible" physical 
and chemical complexities, can still be a pessimist is beyond my 
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comprehension. There is something wrong, not only in his think-
ing processes which are fallible in all of us, but in his entire gen-
eral attitude toward basic problems. I suppose one should apolo-
gize for that indictment, but why do so? A pessimist does not 
expect it. 
* * * * * * 
We may end this paper as it was begun with an appeal to the 
scientists that they make every effort to be understood by the lay 
public. They have an important message to deliver, but tpey have, 
in the main, kept it to themselves. They have at their disposal the 
modern means of communication but they are handicapped by the 
fact that the scientific experts do not speak the language of the 
layman, as Professor Rabi has so forcibly indicated in his Harvard 
address. We must find interpreters to do the job of giving ade-
quate and acceptable publicity to the work of the experts. 
In line with this all-out effort we must discourage the dissem-
ination, in the name of science, of value judgments that are the 
product of men who incline to some form or other of scientism. 
Scientists do not have a monopoly on wisdom and they cannot· 
attack the deep-seated ideologies of the common man and hope to 
retain his confidence. They should not act and speak in a way 
that make possible the publication and popularity of a book like 
Science Is a Sacred Cow. Science has its limitations, and the value 
judgments of the common man, especially of the religious man, 
deserve to be respected. Let's insist, not merely admit, that spirit-
ual values are more important than food, raiment and physical 
comforts. With all his faults the common man recognizes that 
great truth-that spiritual values outweigh the material. And if 
scientists in their publicity efforts will state their agreement with 
that principle they will have taken a big step toward winning the 
confidence of the layman. 
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